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OHIO V CLARK: THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE MANDATORY
REPORTING PROVISIONS & CHILD TESTIMONIAL STATEMENT
IN RELATION TO THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Eun Ji, Kim1

1.

INTRODUCTION

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution
states: "i all criminal prosecitions, the acto be confrontCused shall enjoy the right ...
ed with the witnesses against him ."'M Under

Ohio V. Roberts, the
Un ited States Supreme Courtiniterpreted the
Confrontation Clause to admit a hearsay state-

the pre-CraifoJrdrubric of

ment made by an una vailable witness if the
statement bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability.'" 2 In other words, the Court required the
out-of-court statement to either "fall:] within
a firmly rooted hearsay ex(eption" or contain
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
In 2004, the Supreme Court radically

changed its approach to the Clauise and overruled the Roberts substance-based test.4 In
Crafo ird v. MIaishillgtonl, the Court declared that
"tie Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence. but it is a procedural rath-

er than a sulbstantive guarantee."5 The Roberts
substance -based test allowed a jury to hear
an oit-of-court statement once a court determtine(d that it was reliable regar(less of whether
there had been a prior opportunity for cross
examination of the witness offering testimony
as to the statement.6 In contrast, the Crawfolrd
procedure-based test prohibits the admission
of a testimonial hearsay statement by a nontestifying witness, unless the witness is unavailable, and a defendant had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine the witness.7 Tius, the Crawtest acts irrespective of the statement's in-

jord

dicia of reliabilit,
Not all hearsay statements are subject
to the Confrontation Claise, bitt a testirnonial statement is subject to the Confrontation

Clause." In Crawford, although the Court defined "testimtonv" as "a solernt declaration or
affirmation made fr the purpose of establishing or proving some fact , "' it failed to provide

a comtprehensive definition of a testimonial
statement. o Two years after Crfior/d, in Dacis

t .S. Const. arnend. V1.
OIio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. 56. 66 (1980).
Idfsee also ,illyv. Virginia527US 116 124-25
- Craw ford v Nkashington, 54 1 1US. at 61.
SConpare Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56, with Craw(1999) (plurality opinion) (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66)
("I]t contains 'particularizedguarantees of trustwlorthiford v.Aashington. 541 U.S. at 53.
Id.
ness' such that adversarial testing would be expected
to add little, if anything, to the statements' reliability.");
* Crawford v N ashington, 541 1S. at 51.
Ann Hetherwick Puniphrey, Admissibility ofHearsay
Id. (citation ornitted).
.Statenents to Police: Davis v. Washington and HaninIon v.
10 Ohio v. Clark. 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2179 2015 '"Our deciIndiana. BosToN BJ 17 (2006, (stating that "the excited
sion in Crawjfiord did not offer an exhaustive definition
utterance exception generally used in domestic violence
of "testimonial" statements. Instead, Cra."fordstated
cases" could be an examiplc of a firtI rooted hearsay
that the label "applies at a nuinun to prior testinony
exception").
at a preliminary hearing. before a grand jury, or at a
See Crawford v.Wasihigtoii. 541 U.S. 36. 62 (2004).
former trial; and to police interrogations.").
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v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, the Supreme Court set forth the primary purpose test
to further elucidate what it means for a statement to be labeled "testimonial."n The Court
explained:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there
is no such ongoing emergency,
and that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to establish
or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution. 12
The primary purpose test applies solely
to a statement given to law enforcement officers;
the Supreme Court remained silent on the issue of a similar statement offered to individuals
who are not law enforcement officers until its
2015 decision in Ohio v. Clark." Moreover, even
though the Court had previously attempted
to further clarify the primary purpose test by
requiring consideration of "all of the relevant
circumstances," it had not explicitly addressed
the matter of a declarant's age in determining a
testimonial statement until Ohio c. Clark."
See Davis v.Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
Davis v.Washington, 547 U.S. at 822.
13 See Davis v.Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Ohio v.
Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2179 (2015) (noting that because
prior cases involved statements to law enforcement officers, the Court "reserved the question whether similar
statements to individuals other than law enforcement
officers would raise similar issues under the Confrontation Clause").
14 Michigan v Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 369 (2011).
11

12
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The significance of Ohio v,. Clark is that

it clarifies, for the first time, how to consider
the primary purpose of a non-law enforcement
individual who receives a statement and the
age of a victim who made the statement when
evaluating a challenged statement.1 5 This article
first explores Ohio v. Clark in light of its back-

ground and the Court's legal analysis. Next, it
discusses why Ohio v. Clark renders itself significant on the issue of the principal purpose of
a non-law enforcement individual's interview
with a child victim, and recommends a possible way to determine a non-law enforcement
individual's purpose in a given interview and
assistance provided to a child victim. It then
describes what social science research has told
us about how a victim's age affects his or her
cognitive and perceptive abilities.

2.

OHIO

V. CLARK

2.1. Factual and Procedural Background
Darius Clark lived with his girlfriend
who was a mother of two: her three-year-old
son, L.P, and her eighteen-month-old daughter, A.T.16 When his girlfriend went out of state
to work as a prostitute, Clark agreed to care for
L.P. and A.T.o
In March 2010, when the two children
were in Clark's care, one of L.P.'s preschool
teachers noticed that his eye was "bloodshot.""
When she questioned him about his bloodstained eye, L.P. told his teacher that he fell."
When they moved from the lunchroom to a
classroom which had better lights, the teach-

'5

Ohio v Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2081-82.

16 Id. at 2178.
Id. at 2177-78.
1 Id. at 2178.
19 Id
17

2
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er found additional "red marks" on L.P.'s face.2 0
After being notified by the teacher, the lead
teacher asked L.P who did it and what happened to him. 2 1 L.P. replied: "Dee, Dee." 22 "Dee"

turned out to be a nickname by which Clark
went. 23 The lead teacher took L.P. to her supervisor.24 When the supervisor found more bruis-

es and other injuries on L.P's body, they called
a child abuse hotline to report to authorities
the possibility of abuse. 5
Later, Clark arrived at the preschool to
pick up L P. 26 He denied responsibility of the
bruises and injuries on the boy's body.2 7 On further investigation, a social worker took both of
Clark's girlfriend's children to a hospital where
a physician discovered more injuries not only
on L.P. but also on his sister.2 8
Before trial, L.E was ruled incompetent
to testify due to his age. 29 Under Ohio law, a
witness under ten years old is generally barred
from testifying if he or she "appear[s] incapable
of receiving just impressions of the facts and
transactions respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly." 0 In other words,
L.P. would be prohibited from testifying unless
he showed that he was able to understand the
difference between truth and falsity and appreciate his responsibility to be truthful."
20
21
22
23
24

Id.
Id
Id.
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2177-78.
Id. at 2178.

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Id.

Id. (stating that the boy had "a black eye, belt marks
on his back and stomach, and bruises all over his body";
the girl had "two black eyes, a swollen hand, and a large
burn on her cheek, and two pigtails had been ripped
out at the roots of her hair").
28

29

Id

Ohio R. Evid. 601(A) (Lexis 2015).
See generally State v. Frazier, 61 Ohio St. 3d 247, 251
(Ohio 1991) (enumerating five factors that a trial court
0

At trial, the judge decided that L.P. was
not competent to testify. But one of the hearsay exceptions under Ohio Rule of Evidence
allows the admission of a child's out-of-court
statement in an abuse case.3 2 Consequently, over the defense attorney's objection, the
judge allowed the State to introduce testimony
from the teachers who had talked with L.P. and
heard his statements about the alleged abuse
by Clark."
Clark moved to exclude this evidence
under the Confrontation Clause, but the court
denied his motion on the ground that L.E's
hearsay statements were not testimonial and
so were not covered by the Clause." The jury
found Clark guilty and sentenced him to twenty-eight years' imprisonment. 5 The state appellate court reversed his conviction on the
ground that L.E's hearsay statements were testimonial and thus covered by the Sixth Amendment.3 6 The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed."'
It held that there was no ongoing emergency,
and that under the state mandatory reporting
law, the teachers were acting as agents of law
enforcement." Thus, the court found their primary purpose of questioning was "gather[ing]
evidence potentially relevant to a subsequent
criminal prosecution."" In reaching its conclusion on the issue of whether this was a testimomust consider in determining whether a child witness
under ten is competent to testify: "the child's ability to
receive accurate impressions of fact," "the child's ability
to recollect those impressions," "the child's ability to
communicate what was observed," the child's ability to
understand "truth and falsity," and "the child's appreciation of his or her responsibility to be truthful").
32 See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2178; OHIO R. EVID.
807.
3 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2178.
34 Id.
3 Id.
3 Id

37 Id.
" State v. Clark, 137 Ohio St. 3d 346, 347 (Ohio 2013).
39 Id. at 350.
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nial statement, the court did not consider or
mention L.P.'s age and his primary purpose of
revealing the abuser's name.4 0

2.2. Legal Analysis

certain if it would be safe to release the boy
to Clark, his guardian, at the end of the day;
the circumstances were not clear to the teachers; and the teachers' inquiries were meant to
identify the abuser to protect L.P. from future
attacks.46 Accordingly, the Court found that the

The United States Supreme Court held
that the trial court's decision to allow the admission of L.P.'s out-of-court statements did
not violate the Confrontation Clause. In rendering its judgment under the primary purpose test, the Court considered five factors to
determine "whether statements to persons other than law enforcement officers are subject to
the Confrontation Clause."4 In this section, all
of the five factors are discussed in the order the
Court considered them in its opinion.4 3 Following a brief analysis of the five factors, the next
two sections offer an in-depth examination of
the fifth and third factors, successively.
First of all, the Court concluded that
L.P's statements were made in the context of
an ongoing emergency implicating suspected child abuse. Unlike the Supreme Court
of Ohio, which found that there was no ongoing emergency because L.P. did not complain
about his injuries, and the nature of the teachers' questions suggested a purpose to establish
facts of potential child abusive activities and to
identify the abuser, the Court pointed out several facts of the case to explain why it found
the existence of the ongoing emergency at the
time of L.P.'s statements. The Court said that
the teachers' "immediate concern was to protect a vulnerable child" in that they were not

boy's statements were offered in the context of
the ongoing emergency.
Second, the Court brought attention to
the nature of the conversation between L.P. and
his teachers, which was "informal and spontaneous." The Court stated that his teachers
queried L.P about his injuries in the preschool
lunchroom and classroom but not in a place
like a "formalized station-house."4

also pointed out that the teachers "did so precisely as any concerned citizen would talk to
a child who might be the victim of abuse."' 9
Therefore, the nature of the conversation in
this case implied that it was held informally
rather than formally.50
Third, while the Supreme Court of Ohio
did not take L.P's age into account, the United
States Supreme Court viewed L.P.'s age as an
indication that neither L.P nor his teachers had
the primary purpose of establishing evidence
for the prosecution." Because few preschool
students like L.P. appreciate "the details of [the]
criminal justice system," the Court found that
a three-year-old boy in L.P.'s situation would

46

47
48

o See id. (never mentioning L.P's age in its analysis of
the case).
41 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183.
42 Id. at 2181.
11 See Id. at 2181-82.
11 Id. at 2181.
5 Compare State v. Clark, 137 Ohio St. 3d at 352, with
Ohio v Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol3/iss2/4
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Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.

Id.
Id.

49 Id.
50

Id.

Compare State v. Clark, 137 Ohio St. 3d at 349-55
(finding that the teachers were acting as agents of law
enforcement and that there was lack of an ongoing
emergency to support its conclusion that L.P.'s statements were testimonial), witi Ohio v Clark, 135 S. Ct. at
2181-82 (2015).
1

4
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have not intended his answers to his teachers
to be "a substitute for trial testimony." 52

.

Fourth, the Court cited common law
history." It referred to eighteenth century London, where courts "tolerated flagrant hearsay
. . involving a child victim who was not compe-

3.

NON-LAw ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS

WHO HAVE A STATUTORY DUTY TO REPORT6o

WA/hen assessing challenged statements
in context, the Supreme Court stated that "part
of context is the questioner's identity," and
concluded that L.P and the questioners' rela-

tent to testify because she was too young to ap-

The Court finally gave some guidance to
lower courts on the issue of a statement provided to individuals who are not law enforcement
officers.56 The Court ruled that although it
would not adopt a categorical rule on this matter, it believed that the identity of the questioner
and the relationship between people involved
in the challenged conversation is important.
Moreover, the Court stated that statements offered to a person who does not have a principal duty to discover potential criminal acts are
"significantly less likely to be testimonial than
statements given to law enforcement officers."
Hence, as the relationship between L.P. and the
questioners was that of student-and-teacher,
the Court found that the introduction of L.P.'s
hearsay statements into evidence did not violate the Confrontation Clause."
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182.
53 Id.
6 Id. (citation omitted).
2
55 Id. at 176.
56
See Id. at 2182.
57 Id.
52

58

Id.

See Id. (explaining that the identity of the questioner
and a student-teacher relationship should be considered as one of the circumstantial factors in determining
the primary purpose of the conversation).
5

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College2016
of Law, 2015Washington College of Law
Spring

.

the Court has recognized that the Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of outof-court statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case "at the time of the
founding," L.P's statements were not prohibited by the Sixth Amendment. 5

'o See generally Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1.143, 1162
(2011). (noting that the primary purpose test implicates
not only the declarant's primary purpose in making
statements but also the questioner's primary purpose in
asking the declarant queries). The Court admitted that
its approach was somewhat complicated, however, the
Court justified the complexity of its approach as necessitated by its unwillingness "to sacrifice accuracy for
simplicity." Id. Therefore, from the Court's perspective,
in order to enhance the accuracy of the primary purpose assessment, "consulting all relevant information,
including the statements and actions of interrogators"
is necessary. Id. Butsee Id. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[t]he only virtue of the Court's approach
. . is that it leaves judges free to reach the 'fairest' result
under the totality of the circumstances"). Justice Scalia
also criticized the majority holding, noting that "[i]f the
defendant 'deserves' to go to jail, then a court can focus
on whatever perspective is necessary to declare damning hearsay nontestimonial. And when all else fails,
a court can mix and match perspectives to reach its
desired outcome."Id. In Crawford, the Court defined a
testimonial statement as "a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51. A
prima facie reading of the Court's definition demonstrates that the purpose at issue is that of the individual
who made the statement. The author agrees in part with
the majority and in part with Justice Scalia. The author
believes that because the statement is made by the
declarant, his or her primary purpose should be given
greater weight than that of the questioner. Nevertheless,
the primary purpose of the questioner must be consid
ered in determining the motive of the declarant since
the primary purpose test requires consideration of all of
the relevant circumstances. Stated differently, the fundamental difference between the Court's determination
of whether a statement is testimonial and that proposed
by the author is that under the Court's approach, the
primary purpose of both the declarant and questioner/
listener should be considered, and in deciding their
primary purpose all the relevant circumstances must be
examined, whereas the author's view is that the declarant's primary purpose must be weighed more heavily
than others and in deciding his or her primary purpose,
all the relevant circumstances including the questioner/
listener's primary purpose should be assessed
-

preciate the significance of her oath."5 ' Because

65
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tionship was that of a student-and-teacher.6 1 In
other words, in contrast to a law enforcement
officer, a teacher making queries of her student
does not have a principal duty to discover and
prosecute criminal acts, especially when there
was an ongoing emergency and an urgent concern to protect a vulnerable child. 2
In this evaluation, the Court discussed
the teacher's mandatory reporting obligation
briefly in rebutting Clark's argument that under Ohio law ("the Safe Havens Law"), the
teachers had a duty to report suspected abuse
to appropriate authorities, which in turn made
them act as agents of state law enforcement, so
they should be treated like the police.6 3 Clark's
position was accepted by the Supreme Court
of Ohio:

However, the United States Supreme
Court ultimately reversed the decision of
Ohio's highest court by stating that "mandatory
reporting statutes alone cannot convert a conversation between a concerned teacher and her
student into a law enforcement mission aimed
primarily at gathering evidence for a prosecution.""
The Court's ruling concurs with the legislative intent of all state statutes that impose
a mandatory reporting duty upon certain individuals-professionals and/or other persons
who are not law enforcement officers. 6 None of
the fifty states' laws describe the primary policy
of mandatory obligation as criminal prosecution; indeed, the purpose of mandatory reporting statutes is and should be considered child
61

At the time [the teacher]
questioned L.P., she acted as
an agent of the state for purposes of law enforcement because at a minimum, teachers
act in at least a dual capacity, fulfilling their obligations
both as instructors and also
as state agents to report suspected child abuse pursuant
to [the Safe Havens Law],
which exposes them to liability if they fail to fulfill this
mandatory duty.64

61
62

Ohio v Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182.

protection.

Although the Court did not explicitly
discuss a legislative scheme of the Safe Havens
Law in its decision, looking at the legislative
intent would be one of the important ways to
address an issue of a testimonial statement under the Confrontation Clause. This approach is
consistent with the Court's 2009 decision ofMelendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.6 In Melendez-Diaz,
the Court held that affidavits of a state laboratory analyst who did not testify at a drug trial violated the accused's right under the Sixth
Amendment to confront the witnesses against
him in that under the state law "the sole purpose
of the affidavits was to provide prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net
weight of the analyzed substance."6 9 Therefore,

Id.

Id. at 2182-83.
State v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592, 594 (Oh. 2013). Ohio
law requires professionals including teachers and
school authorities to report suspected child abuse and
neglect to the public children services agency, a inunicipal, or county peace officer when he or she knows
or suspects that a child has suffered mental or physical
injury that reasonably indicates abuse or neglect of the
child. Oino Rv. CODE ANN. § 2151.421.
63

61
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Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183.
See infra notes 75, 80, and text accompanying notes

87-88.
6

See infra notes 75, 80, and text accompanying notes

87-88.
" See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,

311 (2009).
69

Id (citation omitted).
6
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the Court, in Melendez-Diaz, explicitly considered and respected the legislative scheme of
the state statute in addressing the testimonial
nature of challenged statements, in that case an
affidavit, under the Confrontation Clause. 0
As the Court has previously recognized,
a legislative policy behind mandatory reporting
statutes can serve a crucial role in determining
whether an out-of-court statement made pursuant to a state statute is testimonial. Thus, an
in-depth analysis of each state law that mandates either professionals or the general public
to report suspected child maltreatment is highly relevant in determining whether the purpose
of questions made by a teacher is to investigate
and gather evidence for prosecution.
All fifty states have adopted mandatory reporting statutes imposing a duty on certain individuals to report possible child abuse
to appropriate state authorities if they suspect
or have reason to believe that a child has been
abused or neglected." Although these statutes
vary in who has such an obligation,72 in the
types of state authorities which receive the report and take appropriate action, in procedures
as to the time to report and the disclosure of the

reporter's identity," and in standards of making
a report such as reporter's suspicion of, knowledge of, or actual observation of latent child
abuse," they all share, explicitly or implicitly,
the legislative policy of protecting maltreated
children. 5 The mandatory reporting statutes of
the fifty states can be divided into three catego-

ries: (1) states whose explicit primary concern
is to protect a child's health, safety, and welfare,
(2) states that place child's protection as one
of many purposes of the statute, and (3) states
which do not explicitly declare their policy.
First, there are twenty-one states that
articulate the paramount concern and primary
legislative intent of their mandatory reporting
statutes as protecting "children whose health
and welfare may be adversely affected through
abuse and neglect."" Like Ohio v. Clark, when
"

See CHILD WELFARE

INFORMATION GATEWAY,

supra note

71, at 4 (explaining that "[a]ll jurisdictions have provisions in statute to maintain the confidentiality of abuse

and neglect record," but only thirty-nine states specifically protect the identity of the reporters). Compare ALA.
CODE § 26-14-3 and TEX. Emx. CODE § 261.101 (in general, a child abuse mandatory reporting statute requires
an immediate report to appropriate authorities), with
IDAHO CODE § 16-1605 andVT. ANN. STAT. Tit. 33, § 4911
(requiring a report within twenty-four hours).
" See ChildWelfzre Information Gateway, supra note 71
at 3.

70

Id.

"

CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, MANDATORY

REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT

1 (2014)

inafter CHILDVELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY[,

[here-

https://

wwwchildwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf (stating that
"[a]ll states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa,
Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands have statutes identifying persons
who are required to report suspected child maltreatment . . ." For the purpose of this article, fifty states'

statutes are discussed).
72

See

CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAYsupra note

71 at 1-2 (noting that eighteen states require "any person" to report possible child abuse whereas forty-eight
states mandate certain groups of professionals such as
social workers, teachers, physicians, or commercial film
or photograph processors to report).

- See infra notes 77?, 80, and text accompanying notes
87-88.
16 See infra notes 77? 80, 87-88.
" ALA. CODE § 26-14-2; see abo CAL. PEN. CODE §
11164(b) ("The intent and purpose of this article is to
protect children from abuse and neglect."); COLO. REv.
STAT. §19-3-302 ("[I]t is the intent of the general assembly to protect the best interests of children of this

state and to offer protective services in order to prevent
any further harm to a child suffering from abuse.");
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 901 ("The child welfare policy
of this State shall serve to advance the best interests
and secure the safety of the child, while preserving
the family unit whenever the safety of the child is not
jeopardized."); IDAHO CODE § 16-1601 ("At all times the
health and safety of the child shall be the primary concern."); IOWA CODE § 232.67 ("It is purpose and policy.
. . to provide the greatest possible protection to victims
or potential victims of abuse through encouraging the
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the issue is whether a hearsay statement is sub-

ments and actions of the parties . . . in light of

the circumstances in which the [conversation]
occur[red]."'8 As held in Melendez-Diaz, one of
the numerous circumstances can be the purpose of the statute which creates the duty to report and impose that duty on certain persons. 9

.

increased reporting of suspected cases of abuse .... ")
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2201(b) ("The code shall be liberally construed to carry out the policies of the state
which are to [c]onsider the safety and welfare of a child
to be paramount in all proceedings under the code
.
."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 610.101, 620.010 ("The
Commonwealth shall direct its efforts to promoting
protection of children"); LA. CHILD'S CODE ART. 601
("The purpose of this Title is to protect children .
." and [t]his Title is intended to provide the greatest
possible protection as promptly as possible for such
children. The health, safety, and best interest of the
child shall be the paramount concern . . . ."); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 22, § 4003 ("[T]he health and safety of children
must be of paramount concern . . . ."); MAss. ANN. LAWs
ch. 119, § 1 ("The health and safety of the child shall
be of paramount concern ... ."); MINN. ANN. STAT. §
626.556, subd. 1. ("[T]be public policy of this state is to
protect children . . ." and "the health and safety of the
children shall be of paramount concern."); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 28-710.01 ("The Legislature declares that
the public policy of the State of Nebraska is to protect
children whose health or welfare may be jeopardized
by abuse or neglect."); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:2
("It is the purpose of this chapter, through the mandatory reporting of suspected instances of child abuse or
neglect, to provide protection to children whose life,
health or welfare is endangered . . . ."); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:6-8:8 ("The purpose of this act is to provide for the
protection of children under 18 years of age who have
had serious injury inflicted upon them by other than
accidental means."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01

ject to the Confrontation Clause, a court must
determine the primary purpose of the teachers' queries "by objectively evaluating the state-

("The Section . . . shall be liberally interpreted and

construed so as to effectuate the following purposes []
[t]o provide for the case, protection ... of children . .
"); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 26-8A-1 ("It is the purpose of
this chapter to establish an effective state and local system for protection of children from abuse or neglect.");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-402 ("The purpose of this part
is to protect children whose physical or mental health
and welfare are adversely affected by brutality, abuse
or neglect by requiring reporting of suspected cases
by any person having cause to believe that such case
exists."); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.010 ("[T]he Washington state legislature hereby provides for the reporting
of [child abuse] cases to the appropriate public authorities . . ." and "[i]t is intent of the legislature that, as a

result of such reports, protective services shall be made
available in an effort to prevent further abuse, and to
safeguard the general welfare of such children."); Wis.
Stat. § 48.01 ("[T]he paramount goal of this chapter is to
protect children . . . ."); WVyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-201 ("The
child's health, safety and welfare shall be of paramount
concern in implementing and enforcing this article.").
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol3/iss2/4
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Therefore, in the twenty-one states
where the principal legislative intent is protection of abused children, the statutory mandatory reporting obligation would indeed support
the Court's position that the L.P.'s teachers'
"immediate concern was to protect a vulnerable child who needed help."" This argument
is rather strong because the primary purpose
test requires a court to examine circumstances
objectively." Accordingly, if a teacher questions
her student in order to clarify if the student
has been abused, the teacher is acting pursuant to the relevant statute. From an objective
perspective, the teacher's primary efforts to fulfill her duty are equivalent to acting consistent
with the paramount concern and policy of the
statute which enforces that duty: Protecting
abused children.
Second, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia enumerate numerous purposes simultaneously, including the intent of
child's protection, in their mandatory reporting statutes.82 For example, Alaska's law states
three purposes:
Michigan v Bryant, 562 U.S. at 370; see also Ohio v.
Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182.
1 See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311.
80
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.
1 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2009); See also
supra note 10.
12 See Alaska Stat. § 47.17.010; Ark. Code Ann. §
12-18-102; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-101(a); D.C. Code §
4-1321.01; Fla. Stat. § 39.001(1); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-)5(a); 325 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2(a); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-3371
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It is the intent of the legislature that, as a result of these
reports, protective services will
be made available in an effort
to (1) prevent further harm to
the child; (2) safeguard and enhance the general well-being
of children in this state; and (3)
preserve family life unless that
effort is likely to result in physical or emotional damage to the
child."
Similar to Alaska, many states are concerned with the integrity of family life in addition to their efforts to protect physically or
mentally maltreated children." To satisfy this
purpose, some states explicitly stress rehabilitation rather than prosecution. 5
Even though approximately eleven
states in the second category announce thatin addition to their intent to protect abused
children-it is their legislative intent to "encourage the cooperation of state law enforcement officials" and to "provide effective child
services to quickly investigate reports of child
abuse or neglect" by requiring reporting of
a suspected child abuse case, none of these
eleven states explicitly declare prosecution as

their paramount legislative intent. 6 Therefore,
these eleven state statutes cannot be read as
giving more weight to prosecution over other
concerns such as child's protection and family rehabilitation. Indeed, the legislative intent
to facilitate investigation of the reported child
abuse is mere acknowledgment by those states
that a report may have the natural tendency to
result in prosecution of the abuse case.
Finally, while all fifty states have adopted
mandatory reporting statute, there are six remaining states where the state legislature did
not specifically pronounce its policy behind
the obligatory reporting provision. Nonetheless, despite the lack of a stated legislative purpose provision, their intent can be implicitly
deduced by the plain language of their mandatory reporting provisions. For instance, the
United States District Court for the District
of Nevada held that "[t]he plain and unambiguous language of [the mandatory reporting
provision] along with the underlying statutory

Ark. Code Ann. § 12-18-102; Ind. Code Ann. § 31-331-1; see also Md. Fam. Law § 5-702; Mich. Comp. Laws
Serv. § 722 Note; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 210.115; N.Y. Soc.
Serv. Law § 411; Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6302; Utah Code Ann.
§ 62A-4a-401; Vt. Ann. Stat. Tit. 33, § 4911;W Va. Code
§ 49-6A-1. See generally N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32A-1-2,
1-3, 4-3. In New Mexico, the duty to report child abuse
provision is included in the Child Abuse and Neglect
1-1; Md. Fam. Law § 5-702; Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. §
Act, which is Article 4 of the Children's Code. Although
722 Note; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 210.115; Mont. Code Ann.
the Child Abuse and Neglect Act itself does not contain
§ 41-3-101; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-1-3; N.Y. Soc. Serv.
its legislative policy, the Children's Code has the ChilLaw § 411; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-301; N.D. Cent. Code, §
dren's Code General Provisions Act placed in Article 1
50-25.1-01; Okla. Stat. tit. 10A, § 1-1-102; Or. Rev. Stat.
of the Children's Code that generally applies to every
§ 419B.007; 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6302; S.C. Code Ann. §
Article in the Children's Code "unless the context oth63-7-10; Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-401; Vt. Ann. Stat. tit.
erwise requires."Id. § 32A-1-2. Two of eight legislative
33, § 4911;WVa. Code § 49-6A-1.
purposes of the Children's Code General Provisions Act
8 Alaska Stat. § 47.17.010.
are "to provide for the care, protection and wholesome
* See Code Ann. § 12-18-102; D.C. Code § 4-1321.01;
mental and physical development of children" and "to
Fla. Stat. § 39.001(1); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7-5(a); 325 Ill.
provide for the cooperation of coordination of the civil
Comp. Stat. 5/2(a); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-33-1-1; Mich.
and criminal systems for investigation ... to achieve the
Comp. Laws Serv. § 722 Note; Mont. Code Ann. § 41-3best interests of a child victim." Id. § 32A- 1-3.
101; Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.007; 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6302;
83
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3620; Haw. Rev. Stat. §
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-401; WVa. Code § 49-6A-1.
350-1.1; Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-353; Nev. Rev. Stat. §
" See Ind. Code Ann. § 31-33-1-1; Pa. Cons. Stat. §
432B.220; Tex. Fam. Code § 261.101; Va. Code Ann. §
6302.
63.2-1500.
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schemes, indicates that these sections are designed to protect children from abuse and neglect by reporting instances of such conduct.""
In summation, under the primary purpose test, the inquiry must take into account
all of the relevant circumstances that should be
deemed objectively." If a teacher, or any persons who have been identified by state law to
have a duty to report suspected abuse, acted
in a way pursuant to mandatory reporting law,
the primary purpose of the teacher's inquiry
must be viewed objectively. A court must look
at the very statute which mandates the teacher
to question her student and to report the possible abuse to appropriate authorities since the
legislative intent of the mandatory reporting
statute is the teacher's primary purpose of her
fulfilling the duty from the objective viewpoint.
Therefore, in the first category, it is apparent that the reporter's paramount concern is
to protect a child whose safety and welfare may
be adversely affected by abuse and neglect. 0
In the second category, the reporter's principle
intent is to protect the child unless the context
otherwise indicates she acted for the different
purposes of the statute." Finally, in the third
category of six states, the legislative intent can
be implied by the plain and unambiguous languages of the statute, and the primary purpose
of the reporter can also be presumed by the
implied legislative policy unless the context indicates differently otherwise.9 2

" Doe v. State, State Dep't of Educ., No.
02:03CV0150OLRHRJJ, 2006 WL 2583746, at *5 (D. Nev.
Sept. 7, 2006).
9
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180 (citation omitted).
* See supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
91 See supra text accompanying notes 80-86.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
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4. THE DECLARANT'S AGE

AS A

CRUCIAL FACTOR UNDER THE

PRIMARY PURPOSE TEST
The United States Supreme Court's
consideration of L.P.'s age in its opinion is significant in that lower courts and states' highest
courts have long been split as to how to address hearsay statements given by a very young
child, like L.P." Some courts have held that a
declarant's age is pertinent under the primary
purpose test because the declarant's age is one
9 Compare Com. v. Allshouse, 614 Pa. 229, 36 A.3d 163
(2012) (holding that a four-year-old declarant's statements to the children and youth services caseworker
and psychologist were not testimonial; among other
circumstances, a declarant's age is a pertinent characteristic for analysis), State v. Miller, 293 Kan. 535, 264
P3d 461 (2011) (holding that a four-year-old declarant's
statements in response to the sexual assault nurse
examiner's inquiry about what happened were not testimonial, for Confrontation Clause purposes, under the
objective evaluation of the totality of the circumstances
because these circumstances include the victim's age),
People v. Stechliy, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 302, 870 N.E.2d 333
(2007) (holding that a five-year-old declarant's statements to her mother concerning defendant's sexual
abuse were not testimonial under the primary purpose
test because among other reasons, she would not have
anticipated the statement being used in prosecution),
and Com. v. DeOliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 65, 849 N.E.2d 218
(2006) (holding that a six-year-old declarant's statement
to an emergency room physician did not indicate that a
reasonable person in the victim's position would have
anticipated use of her statements against the abuser in
prosecution; the victim's lack of knowledge or sophistication is attributed to her young age), with State v.
Siler, 116 Ohio St.3d 39, 876 N.E.2d 534, 544 (holding
that a three-year-old declarant's statements made in
the course of police interrogation were testimonial;
"the age of a declarant is not determinative of whether
a testimonial statement has been made during a police
interrogation"), People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 926 n. 8
(Colo. 2006) (holding that a seven-year-old declarant's
statement made to "a government agent as part of a
police interrogation . . . is testimonial irrespective of the

child's expectations regarding whether the statement
will be available for use at a later trial[]"), and State v.
Mack, 337 Ore. 586, 588 (Or. 2004) (holding that the
victim's three-year-old brother's statement to a social
worker is testimonial and subject to the Confrontation
Clause).
10
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Generally, in the current legal system,
if a very young child makes a statement to an
authority figure depicting a criminal activity
against an accused at trial then the result is
one of the following: (1) the child may testify
at trial;" (2) evidence of the child's statement
may not be introduced at trial;16 or (3) the evidence may be admitted as an exception of the
hearsay rule." On the other hand, if adults had
made the similar statement in a similar situation, it is rather a simple result. Given that they
would appreciate gravity of their conduct and,
either consciously or unconsciously, intend to
establish some facts potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution, that statement would be
used in a prosecution of the accused assuming
that they testify at trial." If they do not appear
before the court, their hearsay statement is likely to be excluded pursuant to the Confrontation Clause upon a finding that it is testimonial.

young." The Court's decision in Ohio v. Clark
looking at a victim's age-renders itself consis-

of the circumstantial factors which determines
if a statement is testimonial while others have
not even bothered to consider the declarant's
age, as did the Supreme Court of Ohio.9

tent with its precedent, Michigan v. Bryant, clar-

ifying the need of objective assessment to take
10
all of the circumstances into consideration.o
This approach is also harmonious with social
science research.101
Since 1980s, a small but growing numbers of scholars have conducted research to
examine a child's understanding of the legal system. 102 Typically, the research has been
motivated by the need of understanding children's knowledge of their rights in dependency
court 0s and their competency to stand at trial as a witness.10 Results of this research can
be nonetheless read broadly to encompass the
present issue whether a child's statement concerning a criminal activity made to a non-law
enforcement individual would be considered
to be testimonial. This approach is appropriate because the primary purpose test inquires
" See Allshouse, 614 Pa. 229, 36 A.3d at 181.
'0 See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. at 369.
'01 See infra text accompanying notes 102-21.

Alexia Cooper, Allison R. Wallin, Jodi A. Quas,
Thomas D. Lyon, MaltreatedandNonmaltreatedChildren's Knowledge of the Juvenile Dependency Court System,
14(3) CHILD MALTREATMENT 255, 255 (2010).
10 See generally Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)
("A court having jurisdiction over matters involving
abused and neglected children, foster care, the termina9
See Compare Allshouse, 614 Pa. 229, 36 A.3d 163.
tion of parental rights, and (sometimes) adoption.").
9
See, e.g., State v. Cochran, 2004 ME 138 (Me. 2004)
104 See Cooper et al., supra note 102, at 255, 258 (stating
(holding that a five-year-old witness was competent to
that research of children's understanding of legal sysbe a witness under ME. R. EVID. 601(b)).
tem is important because "a lack of knowledge predicts
" See, e.g., State v. Mack, 337 Ore. 586 (Or. 2004)
increased distress and perceptions of unfairness of the
(holding that because a three-year-old witness was not
legal system which not only lead the children to be vulcompetent to be a witness at trial, and his hearsay statenerable in proceedings but also make them have negments were testimonial, the evidence should be excludative attitude toward the legal system"); Rhona H. Flin,
ed).
Yvonne Stevenson, & Graham M. Davies, Children's
9
See, e.g., State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W2d 243 (Minn.
Knowledge of CourtProceedings, 80 BIUTISH J. PSYCHOL.
2006) (finding that a three-year-old child victim's state285, 285 (1989) (stating that "[t]he role of child witnesses
ments to child protection worker during risk-assessin criminal prosecutions and the appropriateness of the
ment interview were not testimonial and thus admissilegal procedures for gathering and testing their evible).
dence have become a matter of intense public concern"
9 Richard D. Friedman & Stephen J. Ceci, Sympobecause children who have witnessed a criminal activity
siumn, The Child QuasiWitness, 82 U. CHI. L. BEV. 89, 90
or were a victim of physical or sexual abuse may be
(2015).
involved in such court proceedings).
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Because all the circumstances have to be
examined in an objective manner, a declarant's
age should not be precluded in court's analysis
especially in a case where the declarant is very
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if the young declarants' statements were made
to "establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution.""o' In
other words, the primary purpose test asks if
the young declarants know the consequences
of their statements. In order to answer this, one
must first ask if they comprehend the legal system.
Numerous studies, not surprisingly,
have revealed that the younger children are,
the less understanding of the legal system
they have. In these studies, children appear to
have little knowledge of the roles and responsibilities of legal professionals.1" For instance,
some researchers conducted a study where
they asked eighty-five children aged from seven to ten various questions about the roles of
key professionals in legal proceedings.10 The
questionnaire included items such as "What
does a judge do?" and "What does a social
worker do?" 0 In the study, age was one of six

"1 Davis v.Washington, 547 U.S at 822.
'1 See, e.g., Cooper et al., supra note 104, at 255, 258
(describing research about age differences in maltreated
and nonmaltreated children's knowledge of juvenile dependency court vocabulary and proceedings in a study
involving young participants whose ages were between
four and fourteen); Flin et al., supra note 104 at 285, 285
(stating that the study included young children aged six,
eight, ten years old, and adults, all of whom were examined by researchers about their knowledge of criminal
court procedures and legal vocabulary).
'1 Stephanie D. Block et. Al., Abused andNeglected Children in Court:Knowledge andAttitudes, 34 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT (2010) 559 (noting that the objective of their
study was to assess maltreated children's understanding and attitudes about their court experiences). This
study was conducted immediately after the participants
attended their dependency court hearings. Although
this research focused on the group of children who
already had some experience of the court proceeding, it
also examined the participant's age difference in understanding the legal system. This study is worth mention
here because children's age difference has a strong
correlation with their knowledge of the legal system,

regardless of their previous exposure to it.
"o Block et al., supra note 106, at 669 app.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol3/iss2/4
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variables-age, abuse type, ethnicity, referred
to criminal court, participation, anxiety-that
the researchers considered as possible predictors of the participants' knowledge of the court
system.1 0 The results revealed that "knowledge was significantly predicted only by age"
and "increased linearly with increasing age."no
The researchers also noted that the remaining
variables were not significantly associated with
children's knowledge "once the effect of age
was estimated.""'
This finding may be attributed to children's limited exposure to legal language. 112
Some linguists noted that children's comprehension of legal terminology is not "an all-ornothing procedure, but, rather a protracted
process."" The linguists conducted a study
to examine children's understanding of legal
terms including "burglary," "police officer," "arrest," "judge," "criminal," "prosecution," "law,"
guilty," and "social workers."" The young participants were divided into four age-groups:
five, seven, eight, and ten."' Results of the
study indicated that while more than a half of
each group understood meanings of "burglary,"
"police officer" and "criminal," none of them
could define "prosecution.""' More interesting
findings of the study were their own primitive
definitions of the legal terms offered by the
participants: "A court is a sort of jail," "[a judge
is] someone who gets money, like at a pet show,"
and "[arrest] means you're lying down.""
109 See Block et al., supra note 106, at 664.

Block et al., supra note 106, at 664 (emphasis added).
Block et al., supra note 106, at 664.
See Block et al., supra note 106, at 660.
11
Michelle Aldridge, Kathryn Timmins, & Joanne
Wood, Children's UnderstandingofLegal Terminology:
Judges GetMoney atPetShows, Don'tThey?, 6 CHILD
ABUSE REV. 141, 141 (1997).
n1 Aldridge et al., supra note 112, at 142.
n" Aldridge et al., supra note 112, at 142.
"6 Aldridge et al., supra note 112, at 142-43.
n1 Aldridge et al., supra note 112, at 144-45.
110

1I
112
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Considering the outcomes of the study,
it is nearly impossible to conclude that young
children have the same mindset as that of adults
when they describe a criminal activity to someone."' These results are not unique in children
who are raised in the United States; it is rather
a universal phenomenon across the world and
is likely due to children's incomplete cognitive
development.11

There is a biological explanation for
this finding. 12 0 The prefrontal cortex of the
brain, which governs "so-called executive
functions such as monitoring, planning, and
impulse control," is not fully developed until
late adolescence.1 2 1 This deficit affects "a web

of interrelated psychological abilities that are
involved in understanding the mental states of
others as well as the effects that one's own actions and statements have on others." 122 Stated
differently, a combination of young children's
lack of understanding of the legal system with
their not-yet- fully- developed pre-frontal cortex
of the brain renders them vulnerable in interacting with others, especially in a situation like
Clark v. Ohio. For instance, when engaging in an
interview with L.P., although the teacher might
have intended to establish facts for a later prosecution of the abuser, it is highly likely that not
only is L.P. incapable of appreciating or even
imagining why the teacher wanted to know
what happened to him, but also he was unable
to consider the significance of his statements
against Clark. Indeed, from the true objective
perspective based on social science research,
very young children lack capacity to offer testimonial statements under the Confrontation
Clause.

u1 See generally Karen Saywitz, Carol Jaenicke, & Lorinda Camparo, Children'sKnowledge ofLegal Terminology,
14 Law & Hum. Behav. 523 (1990) (explaining that the
study assessed children's "age-related patterns in communicative ability relevant to providing testimony" and
tested "knowledge of legal terms commonly used with
children in court." Sixty participants were divided into
At least two unsolved problems-conthree groups for which the mean ages were five, eight,
and eleven, respectively. The researchers used a list of
cerning the Court's ruling on the issue of L.P.'s
thirty-five legal terms, including "evidence," "testify,"
age remain here. First, while the Court found
"attorney," "jury," and "oath," to evaluate the particiit "extremely unlikely" that a child declarant at
pant's understanding. The study revealed that there was
"a significant [age]-related effect).
the age of three intended his statement to be
"' See, e.g., Anna Emilia Berti & Elisa Ugolini, Developused for trial testimony, 123 it did not provide a
ing Knowledge of the JudicialSystem: A Domain-Specific
bright-line rule as to at what age should a miApproach, 159(2) J. of Genetic Psychology 211 (1998)
the
of
knowledge
(concluding that Italian children's
nor's statement be deemed testimonial and
court system, including roles of judges, lawyers, witthus subject to the Confrontation Clause. 2 1
nesses and the jury, improves with increasing age.
Like L.P., there is a group of very immature
First graders showed poor knowledge whereas eighth
graders revealed better understanding); Michele Peterchildren who are generally considered to lack
son-Bradali, Rona Abramovitch, & Juiane Duda, Young
an understanding of the gravity of their statechildren'slegal knowledge and reasoningability, 39 Canament describing a criminal activity. It is hard to
dian J. Criminology 145, 162 (1997) (describing that "[w]
hile ... overall lack of legal knowledge generally applied
imagine that they intend their statement to be
to both the Canadian younger and the older children in
used at trial. On the other hand, there is anoththe present study, the older participants did possess a
er group of children who are likely to apprecisomewhat better sense" than the younger ones).
120 See Friedman & Ceci, supra note 98, at 97.
ate the legal system and thus may understand
121 See Friedman & Ceci, supra note 98, at 97. See generally Monica Luciana & Charles A. Nelson, The Func122 See Friedman & Ceci, supra note 98, at 97-98.
tionalEmergence ofPrefrontally-Guided Working Memory
123 Ohio v. Clark 135 S. Ct. at 2182.
System in Four- to Eight- Year- Old Children,36 Neuropsy124 See id
chologia 273 (1998).
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015Washington College of Law
13
Spring
Washington College of Law
Spring 2016
2016

Criminal Law Practitioner, Vol. 3 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 4

Criminal Law Practitioner

the significance of their statement implicating
the accused with a criminal activity. However,
due to the existence of a gray area between the
two groups and various factors affecting individuals' knowledge and understanding of the
criminal justice system, it seems rather illegitimate to draw a bright-line between the groups
and presuppose a group of children younger
than a particular age is either capable or incapable of making a testimonial statement.
A possible solution to this problem
does not depend on a sole endeavor made by
the legal system. Law practitioners and legal
scholars must look to results and implications
of social science research and derive benefits
from their work. And social science researchers
must study not only children's understanding
of legal vocabulary and court system (indirect
way) but also children witnesses' understanding of the consequence of their statements (direct way).
The second unsolved question is why
out-of-court statements made by an incompetent witness can be introduced into evidence.
Here, L.P. was ruled incompetent to testify because of his age.125 The trial court found that L.P.
appeared incapable of differentiating between
truth and falsity."I In other words, L.P. was considered too unreliable to testify in court. But
the Court held that L.P's hearsay statements
were not testimonial and thus should be admitted at trial.1 27 One of the disturbing aspects
of the case is that Clark was convicted based on
the hearsay statements of L.P. who was statutorily incompetent to testify at trial.
One possible way to reconcile this discrepancy necessitates a review of the Craw-

Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2178.
See id.
127 See id. at 2183.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol3/iss2/4
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ford case where the Court declared that the
Confrontation Clause's fundamental aim is to
"ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee."12 8
As aforementioned, not every out-of-court
statement is open to being challenged under
the Confrontation Clause; rather, the procedural protection against hearsay statements is
against testimonial statements made against
the accused. Provided that the totality of the
circumstances shows the challenged statement
is not testimonial, like in Ohio v. Clark, there is

no confrontation problem so far as the Sixth
Amendment is concerned.
This unsolved issue illustrated in the
Clark case is not solely related to the Confrontation Clause, but it is in fact one of the classic
concerns of hearsay exceptions: choice between
exclusion of unreliable evidence and inclusion
of imperfect evidence. All evidence is imperfect to some extent. Generally out-of-court
statements are not admissible because they are
neither subject to cross-examination nor made
under oath. Further, they raise credibility, accuracy, and confrontation concerns. Nonetheless,
some hearsay statements are admissible as long
as they are relevant, and the statement's probative value is not substantially outweighed by
a danger of unfair prejudice. 1 29 Once admitted,
the substantive reliability and credibility of the
evidence must be decided by the trier of fact.
Therefore, although the Ohio statute deemed
L.P. incompetent due to his age and considered
him unreliable to testify in court, the reliability
of his out-of-court statement made in his daily
life-different from the court setting-must be
addressed by the jury. This answer to the second question appears to be consistent with the
Court's position.
128

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 61 (emphasis

added)
129

See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403.
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5. CONCLUSION
In Clark v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of
a statement provided to individuals who are
not law enforcement officers and considered
a declarant's age to support its holding of the
non-testimonial nature of L.P.'s statements. 1s0
As to the first issue, the Court disagreed
with the Supreme Court of Ohio's finding that
the teacher's mandatory reporting duty made
them act as agents of the state law enforcement,
and stated that "mandatory reporting statutes
alone cannot convert a conversation between a
concerned teacher and her student into communication aimed primarily at gathering evidence for a prosecution."" Although the Court
declined to adopt a categorical rule on this matter, the legislative scheme of the relevant statute must be considered, especially when the
statute provides the sole legislative purpose. 132
This approach-looking to the legislative intent of the statute - is consistent with
13 Nonethe Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz."
theless, the legislature's declaration of policy
must not be treated as a dispositive factor in
determining what the reporter's purpose was
in questioning a child. As suggested above, it
should be considered as one of all the relevant
'10 See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181-82.
131 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183.
132 See id. at 2182.
133 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305

(2009).

factors including, but not limited to, the identity of the person who asked the declarant questions, and "the content and tenor of his [or her]
questions[.]""' Thus, if the content and tenor
of the teacher's questions along with the other
relevant circumstances-the legislative scheme
of the statute- demonstrate that the primary
purpose of the teacher's inquiries was to establish or prove past events, the trier of fact could
objectively find that the teacher's primary purpose was prosecution-acting as an agent of
law enforcement-and not protection.
Concerning the declarant's age, the
Court explicitly stated that statements made by

very young children like L.E will hardly ever implicate the Confrontation Clause."' The Court
not only acknowledged the implications of research on children's understanding of the judicial system but also found that it is "extremely
unlikely" that a three-year-old child would ever
intend his statement to be used for trial testimony.1 16 As stated above, young children do
not have the cognitive capacity that adults have.
Therefore, unless the context shows differently,
a very young child's statement should not be
considered to have testimonial nature due to
the very reason that the Court mentioned.

I3 Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 369 (stating that
"'the identity of an interrogator, and the content and
tenor of his questions,' can illuminate the 'primary purpose of the interrogation[]"').
135 Ohio v. Clark 135 S. Ct. at 2182.
136

Id.
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